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REMARKS ON THE INSTALLATION OF 
MARC O. DEGIROLAMI  
AS THE INAUGURAL CARY FIELDS CHAIR 
MARK L. MOVSESIAN† 
I am grateful for this opportunity to make some brief remarks 
in honor of the inaugural Cary Fields Professor of Law, my  
friend and colleague, Marc DeGirolami.  My work as a scholar and 
teacher, and my flourishing as a person, owe much to him, and to 
his wife, Lisa, and his son, Thomas, with whom I have spent many 
happy hours over the past decade, both in New York and in Rome, 
where our work as co-directors of the Center for Law and Religion 
often takes us.  
I will not speak tonight about what Marc’s friendship means 
to me, personally, though.  Rather, I will address what his 
presence means to our law school, and why he so richly deserves 
the honor our school has bestowed on him.  For ten years, Marc 
has been a pillar of our academic community.  He was a driving 
force behind the Center’s most recent initiative, the Tradition 
Project—a three-year endeavor that brought together scholars, 
jurists, and journalists to discuss the continuing value of tradition 
in law, politics, and culture.  I will have much to say tonight about 
the role of tradition in Marc’s thought.  He is a talented and 
beloved teacher who has taught across the curriculum, offerings 
as diverse as Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Torts, and 
Professional Responsibility.  Marc has helped shape hundreds of 
our alumni, who will carry the memory of his classes with them 
throughout their careers.  
Tonight, though, I would like to focus on Marc’s contributions 
as a tireless, thoughtful, and influential scholar.  He always has 
several writing projects underway, and several more in his head, 
waiting to be put to paper.  This energy explains Marc’s great 
productivity:  one book (so far) and dozens of chapters, articles, 
essays, and blog posts.  He is a widely sought-after speaker at law 
 
† Frederick A. Whitney Professor of Contract Law and Co-Director, Center for 
Law and Religion. 
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schools and universities.  Marc’s latest paper, on traditionalist 
interpretation, has the potential to reshape the way scholars 
understand how the Supreme Court decides cases under  
the Constitution.1  
Three interrelated themes characterize Marc’s work:   
a commitment to legal scholarship in the old dispensation; a 
healthy skepticism about theory, or at least about univalent 
theories that attempt to explain law in terms of a single goal or 
interest; and a recognition of law’s inevitable complexity.  I would 
like to say a word about each of these themes and then show how 
they blend together to give Marc’s scholarship its unique, and 
paradoxically novel, voice.  In tradition, Marc has discovered an 
overlooked source of insights about law that suggest a new and 
exciting path forward for the scholarly community.  
First, Marc’s work reflects a commitment to traditional legal 
scholarship—a sort of scholarship of which we see less and less, 
sadly.  Most of us today are specialists.  We know a lot about a 
particular area of law, but not so much about others.  
Traditionally, though, American legal scholars were generalists, 
who over the course of a career would write about many different 
subjects.  True, a scholar might devote special attention to a 
particular field—John Henry Wigmore on evidence or Samuel 
Williston on contracts or Soia Mentschikoff on commercial law.  
But the best scholars often branched out into different areas.   
I think of someone like Grant Gilmore, an expert in contracts, but 
also in secured transactions and admiralty—and French 
literature!  (His specialty was the symbolist poet Stéphane 
Mallarmé).2  Traditional scholarship assumed, in the phrase we 
usually attribute to Maitland, that law is “a seamless web,” and 
that it is not profitable, or even possible, to try to understand one 
subject without knowing something about all the others.3  
 
 
1 Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (St. John’s Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 19-0019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3349187 [hereinafter DeGirolami, Traditions of American Constitutional 
Law]. 
2 On Gilmore and Mallarmé, see Phillip C. Bobbitt, The Age of Consent, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2334, 2334 (2014).  
3 On Maitland, see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: The Law is a 
Seamless Web, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 1, 2006, 2:54 PM), https://lsolum.typepad. 
com/legaltheory/2006/10/legal_theory_le.html.  
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As I say, we have moved to a different model of legal 
scholarship today, a more specialized model, much in the manner 
of other disciplines like medicine.  But, in his work, Marc has 
maintained the traditional, generalist approach.  He has written 
in many different areas and his repertory continues to expand.  He 
has written extensively in law-and-religion, his main area of 
expertise.4  He has written in criminal law, for example, on 
culpability and on punishment theory.5  He has written in 
constitutional law, both generally with regard to constitutional 
interpretation and specifically with respect to the First 
Amendment.6  Lately, he is branching out into torts.7  
Marc’s work reflects the traditional model in another 
important way as well.  Marc pays attention to other scholars.  
Now, of course, all of us pay attention to the work of our 
contemporaries.  It is important to do so in order to contribute to 
the scholarly conversation—and to be cited ourselves!  But Marc’s 
work recognizes that brave men lived before Agamemnon and that 
one should not ignore the contributions of scholars who thought 
and wrote long before we came onto the scene.8  All scholars are, 
in a sense, contemporaries.  Scholarship partakes of the eternal.  
In an article he wrote for the Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law in 2012, Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, Marc argued that contemporary 
 
4 E.g., MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013) 
[hereinafter DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM]; Marc O. 
DeGirolami, The Two Separations, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 396 (Michael Breidenbach & Owen Anderson, 
eds., forthcoming Feb. 2020); Marc O. DeGirolami, On the Uses of Anti-Christian 
Identity Politics, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
COMMON GROUND (William Eskridge & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2018). 
5 Marc O. DeGirolami, Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 699 (2012) [hereinafter DeGirolami, James 
Fitzjames Stephen]; Marc O. DeGirolami, Culpability in Creating the Choice of Evils, 
60 ALA. L. REV. 597 (2009).  
6 E.g., DeGirolami, Traditions of American Constitutional Law, supra note 1; 
Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME  
L. REV. 1465 (2016) [hereinafter DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First 
Amendment].  
7 Marc O. DeGirolami, A Theory of Malice (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author). 
8 “Many brave men lived before Agamemnon: but all of them, unlamented and 
unknown, are overwhelmed with endless obscurity, because they were destitute of a 
sacred bard.” HORACE, IV ODES: ODE IX TO MARCUS LOLLIUS (C. Smart, A.M. trans., 
Theodore Alois Buckley B.A. ed., Nov. 11, 2004) (ebook). Samuel Willison once used 
this phrase to dismiss the pretensions of the Legal Realists. See Mark L. Movsesian, 
Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 273 (2005).  
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punishment theorists should “open themselves” to the scholarship 
of the past—in particular, to the writing of the Victorian scholar, 
James Fitzjames Stephen.9  Looking to Stephen, Marc wrote, 
would illuminate issues and help contemporary scholars fashion, 
and perhaps modify, their own approaches.10  Similarly, in a 2016 
article in the Notre Dame Law Review, Virtue, Freedom, and the 
First Amendment, about which I will say more later, Marc drew on 
the work of the late political theorist Walter Berns.11  Looking to 
someone like Berns was “somewhat unusual,” Marc conceded, but 
nonetheless vital, as the insights Berns developed in his work 
would help today’s scholars understand the values that drive 
contemporary Supreme Court decisions in the free speech area.12 
The second theme that characterizes Marc’s work is a 
skepticism about high theory, especially theory that attempts to 
explain a body of law through a single, abstract concept.  Now, we 
academics tend to like theory.  Theory plays to our strengths as 
intellectuals and systematizers, and glory often goes to the person 
who finds the master key that can unlock legal problems and 
render the theories of other scholars unnecessary.  Marc does not 
reject theory entirely—no scholar can go that far—but he is 
cautious about it for two reasons.  First, abstract theories often 
lose sight of lived experience.  To be legitimate, law must fit the 
multitudinous circumstances of a real-world political community.  
It must reflect that community’s history and tradition and the 
conflicting values that history and tradition inevitably manifest.  
Abstract theories that ignore real-world particularities are, in 
Marc’s words, “beguiling but ultimately misleading.”13  
For example, in a forthcoming piece in the Notre Dame Law 
Review, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, Marc 
shows how the Supreme Court often interprets constitutional 
language in a way that favors longstanding customs over  
abstract concepts.14  Marc calls this method “traditionalist 
interpretation”—a method that “focuses on practices, rather than 
abstract principles or general tests,” to inform constitutional 
meaning.15  As one example of this approach, he gives a recent 
 
9 DeGirolami, James Fitzjames Stephen, supra note 5, at 702. 
10 See id.  
11 DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, supra note 6, at 1468. 
12 Id. 
13 DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 7. 
14 DeGirolami, Traditions of American Constitutional Law, supra note 1.  
15 Id. at 2. 
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Establishment Clause case, Town of Greece v. Galloway, which 
upholds the constitutionality of legislative prayer.16  In holding the 
practice constitutional, the Court stressed that legislative prayer 
is a longstanding, continuous custom in America that dates to the 
early Republic.17  As I read him, Marc favors this traditionalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, at least most of the time.  
A different approach, one focused on abstract ideas like equality 
or neutrality, would illegitimately slight the lived experience of 
millions of Americans over the course of centuries—and, 
inevitably, reflect the values and commitments of a narrow set  
of actors, judges, and scholars at the expense of citizens  
more broadly.18  
Marc is skeptical about high theory for another reason as well.  
Theory, Marc believes, can obscure what is really going on in the 
cases.  For example, in the article about the First Amendment I 
mentioned a moment ago, in which he cites Walter Berns, Marc 
critiques the conventional theory that explains the Court’s 
free-speech jurisprudence in the second half of the twentieth 
century in terms of an abstract commitment to neutrality—a 
refusal on the Court’s part to prefer one substantive vision of the 
good society to others.19  The Court’s commitment to neutrality, 
the theory goes, explains why it was willing to rule that 
centuries-old blasphemy laws were invalid and that pornography, 
long reviled in the law, was constitutionally protected speech.  In 
fact, Marc argues, this theory misrepresents what the Court was 
doing in its First Amendment jurisprudence.  What the Court was 
actually doing was not upholding substantive neutrality, but 
steering America away from one substantive vision of the good 
society to another.20  
The emphasis on the particular and concrete, rather than the 
universal and abstract, leads me to the third theme that 
characterizes Marc’s work:  a recognition of law’s inevitable 
complexity.  Law always reflects the ambient culture—and no 
culture is ever simple.  Culture always embodies conflicting 
values, which exist in a tension that is never fully resolved.  Our 
 
16 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). For DeGirolami’s treatment of this case, see DeGirolami, 
Traditions of American Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
17 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818–25. 
18 See DeGirolami, Traditions of American Constitutional Law, supra note 1,  
at 48. 
19 DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, supra note 6, at  
1490–98. 
20 Id. at 1516.  
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own culture, for example, historically has been committed, all at 
once, to both individual and community, to both faith and 
skepticism, to both equality and liberty.  Consequently, our law  
is pulled in different directions and never settles on a single, 
unifying value.  The wise scholar, Marc maintains, recognizes the 
irresolvable tensions and does not content himself with simple, 
artificial solutions.  He accepts that law will always reflect a 
plurality of values that never quite cohere.  
The best example of this theme in Marc’s work is his 2013 
book, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom.21  In that book, Marc 
develops a conception of religious liberty that avoids “reductive 
and systematic justifications.”22  Marc’s crucial insight is that one 
cannot explain or defend religious liberty in terms of a single, 
abstract value.  When it comes to religious liberty, our culture,  
and consequently our law, is committed to values that are 
“incompatible and incommensurable,” including piety, autonomy, 
egalitarianism, and majority rule, to name just a few.23  This is 
why, Marc maintains, conflicts over religious liberty are 
ultimately “tragic,” in the “classical and literary” sense:  they do 
not admit of harmonious conclusions in which all tensions are 
resolved, as in a happy wedding at the end of a play.24  The wise 
judge understands this fact and approaches such conflicts with a 
modest understanding of what he or she can accomplish with any 
particular decision—and with the recognition that all judicial 
resolutions are, in the deepest sense, provisional.  
So, these three themes characterize Marc’s work:   
a commitment to old-fashioned legal scholarship; a focus on 
concrete particularities, rather than abstractions; and a 
recognition of law’s inevitable complexity and pluralism.  These 
are the virtues of a Burkean conservatism—rather than one of the 
many varieties of modern conservatism, which place great store in 
economic theory and often focus on one value, like liberty or 
nationalism, to the exclusion of others.  The virtues of Burkean 
conservatism are tradition, balance, prudence, respect for religion, 
and recognition of the great plurality of values that make up a 
culture.  One does not encounter this approach very much in  
the academy today, but it is Marc’s own, and he employs it with 
great skill.  
 
21 DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 4.  
22 Id. at 3. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 55. 
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That is why I said at the beginning that Marc’s voice  
is, paradoxically, a novel one—and here I will close.  We are 
accustomed to think of the great scholar as the person who comes 
up with something no one has thought of before:  a new theory, a 
new explanation, a new prescription that will change the law in 
exciting ways.  But, like the actor in that old French film says, 
“Novelty is as old as the hills.”25  In looking to tradition, Marc  
has discovered something new and overlooked in the legal 
academy—something that will add to our knowledge and 
understanding of how law works and should work.  I know that all 
of us here look forward to watching Marc develop his insights in 
the years ahead, and congratulate him as he receives the Cary 
Fields Chair tonight.  
 
 
25 CHILDREN OF PARADISE (Pathé 1945).  
